German Unification DBQ
Directions: Use the following documents to organize an answer to the question below.
Question: Evaluate the extent to which German nationalism or Prussian political aspirations were more important in the unification of Germany.
Document 1: Historian R.R. Palmer, on German Unification, 2002
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Gradually, as we have seen, the Germans became dissatisfied with their position. They became nationalistic during and after the Napoleonic wars. Many German thinkers held that Germany was different from the West, destined someday to work out a peculiarly German way of life and political system of its own. To the Slavs the Germans felt immeasurably superior. German philosophy, as shown most clearly in Hegel, took on a certain characteristic tone. It pronounced individualism to be Western; it skipped lightly over individual liberty; it tended to glorify group loyalties, collectivist principles, and the state. It emphasized the progressive evolution of history, which in the thought of Hegel, and after him Marx, became a vast impersonal force almost independent of human beings. History was said to ordain, require, necessitate, condemn, justify, or excuse. What one did not like could be dismissed as a mere historical phase, opening into a quite different and more attractive future. What one wanted, in the present or future, could be described as historically necessary and bound to come.
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Document 2: Johann Gustav Droysen: Speech to the Frankfurt Assembly, 1848
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We cannot conceal the fact that the whole German question is a simple alternative between Prussia and Austria. In these states German life has its positive and negative poles--in the former, all the interests which are national and reformative, in the latter, all that are dynastic and destructive. The German question is not a constitutional question, but a question of power; and the Prussian monarchy is now wholly German, while that of Austria cannot be. . . .We need a powerful ruling house. Austria's power meant lack of power for us, whereas Prussia desired German unity in order to supply the deficiencies of her own power. Already Prussia is Germany in embryo. She will "merge" with Germany. . .
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Document 3: Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia: Proclamation of 1849
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I am not able to return a favorable reply to the offer of a crown on the part of the German National Assembly [meeting in Frankfurt], because the Assembly has not the right, without the consent of the German governments, to bestow the crown which they tendered me, and moreover because they offered the crown upon condition that I would accept a constitution which could not be reconciled with the rights of the German states.
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Document 5: Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke: 1866
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The war of 1866 [between Prussia and Austria] was entered on not because the existence of Prussia was threatened, nor was it caused by public opinion and the voice of the people; it was a struggle, long foreseen and calmly prepared for, recognized as a necessity by the Cabinet, not for territorial aggrandizement, for an extension of our domain, or for material advantage, but for an ideal end--the establishment of power. Not a foot of land was exacted from Austria, but she had to renounce all part in the hegemony of Germany. . . Austria had exhausted her strength in conquests south of the Alps, and left the western German provinces unprotected, instead of following the road pointed out by the Danube. Its center of gravity lay out of Germany; Prussia's lay within it. Prussia felt itself called upon and strong enough to assume the leadership of the German races.
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Document 6: Otto von Bismarck: 1866
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We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia. . . .The acquisition of provinces like Austria Silesia and portions of Bohemia could not strengthen the Prussian state; it would not lead to an amalgamation of German Austria with Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed from Berlin as a mere dependency. . . .Austria's conflict and rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her; our task was the establishment or foundation of German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia.
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Document 7: Otto von Bismarck: Addressing the start of the Franco-Prussian war, in his memoirs
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“After I had read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke remarked: ‘Now it has a different ring; in its original form it sounded like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.’ I went on to explain: “If, in execution of his Majesty's order, I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull.
“Fight we must if we do not want to act the part of the vanquished without a battle. Success, however, depends essentially upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the ones attacked, and the Gallic insolence and touchiness will bring about this result if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we can without the speaking tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France." |
Document 8: Political Cartoon - Harper's Weekly
The cartoon is titled "Taking a Rest" 1877 This Harper's Weekly cartoon by Thomas Nast addresses the "Chancellor Crisis" of 1877, when German chancellor Otto von Bismarck took an extended leave of absence from his political duties. It was an act that caused great concern and uncertainly among many of the other world powers. The German phrase in the caption is part of the title "The Watch on the Rhine," a song popular with German soldiers during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The cartoonist has altered it to translate into "The Watch on Bismarck" to emphasize the message that the eyes of the world are watching what Bismarck will do next. |