Case Study: The Trial of a King
Reading:
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For this case study you are to analyze Chapter 15 Constitutional Rule in England and the Dutch Republic (Pgs. 492 - 498) and review the sources provided below. You are expected to be able to answer the guiding question in full depth with specific historical evidence and supporting details.
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In 1625, against a background of political and religious conflict across Europe, Charles I inherited the thrones of three British kingdoms: England (with Wales), Ireland and Scotland. Although he ruled all three kingdoms, they did not constitute a single unit: each kingdom had its own culture, its own religious arrangements and its own parliament. He was king by inheritance - as the eldest living son of King James I - and by Divine Right, chosen and approved by God, symbolized in the coronation ceremony.
Civil War in England was sparked by rebellions in Scotland and Ireland in 1642, and the king was eventually defeated by an army organised and led by the English parliament. From 1646 to 1648, the victorious parliamentarians attempted to negotiate a settlement with the king, but Charles refused to negotiate honestly and used the time to raise new forces and renew the war with the help of the Scots. In 1649, this Divine Right monarch was executed in a public beheading outside the Banqueting Hall of his own Palace of Whitehall in London. Moreover, the death of the king was followed by the formal abolition of the monarchy and England's only period of republican government.
This action, and the ideology, that motivated it, led some historians to view these events as an English Revolution, a forerunner of the similar events that took place in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. Charles was not the first monarch to meet a violent death, but he was the first to be publicly tried in the name of the people and executed according to judicial procedures while still king. The implication was that kings could be held responsible by their subjects, and not by God alone. Although the monarchy was restored in 1660, and Charles's sons still claimed to rule by Divine Right, in practice Charles II and then James II knew the possible consequences of conflict with parliament. When James faced the prospect of a new civil war in 1688, he fled into exile in France rather than risk his father's fate. The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, and the settlments that followed it, owed much to the lessons learned in 1649.
Civil War in England was sparked by rebellions in Scotland and Ireland in 1642, and the king was eventually defeated by an army organised and led by the English parliament. From 1646 to 1648, the victorious parliamentarians attempted to negotiate a settlement with the king, but Charles refused to negotiate honestly and used the time to raise new forces and renew the war with the help of the Scots. In 1649, this Divine Right monarch was executed in a public beheading outside the Banqueting Hall of his own Palace of Whitehall in London. Moreover, the death of the king was followed by the formal abolition of the monarchy and England's only period of republican government.
This action, and the ideology, that motivated it, led some historians to view these events as an English Revolution, a forerunner of the similar events that took place in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. Charles was not the first monarch to meet a violent death, but he was the first to be publicly tried in the name of the people and executed according to judicial procedures while still king. The implication was that kings could be held responsible by their subjects, and not by God alone. Although the monarchy was restored in 1660, and Charles's sons still claimed to rule by Divine Right, in practice Charles II and then James II knew the possible consequences of conflict with parliament. When James faced the prospect of a new civil war in 1688, he fled into exile in France rather than risk his father's fate. The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, and the settlments that followed it, owed much to the lessons learned in 1649.
Key Concept:
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Guiding Question - Skill: Continuity and Change over Time
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Timeline:
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← English Civil War 1642 - 1649 ← Glorious Revolution 1688 |
Sources:
Source 2: James I, True Law of Free Monarchies and a Speech to Parliament
An articulate defense of the divine right of monarchy was composed by James VI, who was king of Scotland (1567-1625) and as James 1 (1603-1625) also was king of England. A scholar as well as a king, James in 1598 anonymously published a widely read book called the True Law of Free Monarchies. He claimed that the king alone was the true legislator. James's notions of the royal prerogative and of the role of Parliament are detailed in the following passages from the True Law and a speech to Parliament. |
TRUE LAW Prerogative and Parliament According to these fundamental laws already alleged, we daily see that in the parliament (which is nothing else but the head court of the king and his vassals) the laws are but craved by his subjects, and only made by him at their [proposal] and with their advice: for albeit the king make daily statutes and ordinances, [imposing] such pains thereto as he thinks [fit], without any advice of parliament or estates, yet it lies in the power of no parliament to make any kind of law or statute, without his scepter [that is, authority] be to it, for giving it the force of a law. . . . And as ye see it manifest that the king is over-lord of the whole land, so is he master over every person that inhabiteth the same, having power over the life and death of every one of them: for although a just prince will not take the life of any of his subjects without a clear law, yet the same laws whereby he taketh them are made by himself or his predecessors; and so the power flows always from himself .. . Where he sees the law doubt-some or rigorous, he may interpret or mitigate the same, lest otherwise summum jus be summa injuria [the greatest right be the greatest wrong]: and therefore general laws made publicly in parliament may upon . . . [the king's] authority be mitigated and suspended upon causes only known to him.
As likewise, although I have said a good king will frame all his actions to be according to the law, yet is he not bound thereto but of his good will, and for good example-giving to his sub-jects. . . So as I have already said, a good king, though he be above the law, will subject and frame his actions thereto, for example's sake to his subjects, and of his own free will, but not as subject or bound thereto. . In a speech before the English Parliament in March 1610, James elaborated on his exalted theory of the monarch's absolute power. A SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT . . . The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth: for kings are not only God's lieu-tenants upon earth and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called gods. There be three principal [comparisons] that illustrate the state of monarchy: one taken out of the word of God, and the two other out of the grounds of policy and philosophy. In the Scriptures kings are called gods, and so their power after a certain relation compared to the Divine power. Kings are also compared to fathers of Families: for a king is truly parens patriae [parent of the country], the politic father of his people. And lastly, kings are compared to the head of this microcosm of the body of man. . . . I conclude then this point touching the power of kings with this axiom of divinity, That as to dispute what God may do is blasphemy, ... so is it sedition in subjects to dispute what a king may do in the height of his power. But just kings will ever be willing to declare what they will do, if they will not incur the curse of God. I will not be content that my power be disputed upon; but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my laws. . . . Now the second general ground whereof I am to speak concerns the matter of grievances. . . . First then, I am nor to find Fault that you in-form yourselves of the particular just grievances of the people; nay I must tell you, ye can neither be just nor faithful to me or to your countries that trust and employ you, if you do it not. . . . But I would wish you to be careful to avoid [these] things in the matter of grievances. First, that you do not meddle with the main points of government: that is my craft . . . to meddle with that, were to lessen me. I am now an old king ... ; I must not be taught my office. Secondly, I would not have you meddle with such ancient rights of mine as I have received from my predecessors, possessing them more majorum [as ancestral customs]: such things I would be sorry should be accounted for grievances. All novelties are dangerous as well in a politic as in a natural body: and therefore I would be loath to be quarreled in my ancient rights and possessions: for that were to judge me unworthy of that which my predecessors had and left me. |
Source 3: From “The Declaration of Charles I,” published March 10th, 1629
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Howsoever princes are not bound to give an account of their actions but to God alone…we have thought good to set thus much down by way of declaration, that we may appear to the world in the truth and sincerity of our actions…As we have been careful for the settling of religion and quieting the church, so we were not unmindful of the preservation of the just and ancient liberties of our subjects… [but] the House of Commons hath of late years endeavored to extend their privileges by setting up general committees for religion, for courts of justice, for trade and the like…So as, where in former times the Knights and Burgesses were wont to communicate to the house such business as they brought from their countries now…they make enquiry upon all sorts of men…to break through all respects and ligaments of government, and to erect a universal over-swaying power to themselves, which belongs only to us, and not to them.
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Source 4: Van Dyck, Portrait of Charles I
The famous equestrian portrait, for instance, is heavily symbolic. Both Charles and Van Dyck had absorbed Platonic ideas about the ideal ruler whose ability to rule his own passions is analogous to his ability to rule the state. The work recalls the famous chariot analogy that appears in Plato's philosophical dialogue, Phaedrus. In the analogy, a wild, troublesome, difficult horse represents the turbulent human passions, and a gentle horse represents the more positive human emotions. Both must be controlled by the charioteer, which represents human reason and the intellect. In the Van Dyck painting, Charles I easily controls his horse with the very lightest of touches. He is thus spun as the wise, powerful, yet gentle ruler of Platonic ideal |
Source 5: C. Carlton, Three British Revolutions and the Personality of Kingship (1980)
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An authoritarian personality, Charles was incapable of conceding at a time when compromises were desperately demanded from the English monarchy. He was full of that outward self-certainty (manifest in such doctrines as divine right) that only intense inner doubt can engender…Charles saw his kingly role as a judge to whom issues were taken for decision…not that of a bargainer who settled disputes between rival branches of government, and negotiated settlements with powerful interest groups. Charles was psychologically incapable of dealing with a parliament that was anything more than a rubber stamp.
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Source 6: Anthony Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War, 1981
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Great events do not necessarily have great causes, though it is natural for historians to seek them. Most of [the MPs] who rode up to Westminster in November 1640 had no concept of a parliamentary cause in their minds. Reconciliation and settlement were seen as the purposes of parliaments, and the reforms that most MPs envisaged seemed perfectly compatible with such an end. Only Pym and a few close friends saw the matter in totally different terms: for them the parliamentary cause was the rooting out of a conspiracy that struck at the core of the nation’s life…All this, though, is only one side of the picture. Charles I had a jaundiced [skeptical] view of parliaments and a strong sense of distrust of certain individuals who, he believed, were ready to challenge his monarchy for private and selfish ends. [This] would have been less serious if his character had been different. He was a man who magnified distrust even in the most loyal hearts.
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