Case Study: Causes of the War
One could argue that the First World War was the twentieth century's most cataclysmic event. It was responsible for the destruction of four major empires (Turkish, Russian, Austrian, and German), was tied inexorably to the rise of fascism and communism, and caused more death and carnage than any event up to that time. It also created an age of anxiety and alienation that shook the foundations of the Western artistic, musical, philosophical, and literary worlds. No wonder it has attracted the attention of countless historians, who have scrutinized every aspect in search of lessons that can be derived from it.
The major historical questions to answer are why it occurred and who was responsible for it—a daunting task yet an important one if we are to learn any lessons from the mistakes of the past. Historians have identified four major long-range causes of the war: nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the alliance system. But these causes only partly answer why in August 1914, after a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, Europe divided into two armed camps—the Allied Governments (England, France, and Russia, and later, Italy) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire)—and engaged in a conflict that would involve most European countries and spread to the rest of the world.
Important as these factors are, they fail to include the human factor in the equation. To what extent were the aims and policies of the major powers, which were formulated by individuals acting on behalf of national states, responsible for the war? Is there enough culpability to go around? Or was one nation and its policymakers responsible for the onset of the Great War? Of course, the Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the war, answered the question of responsibility. In the now-famous Article 231, Germany and her allies were held accountable for the war and all concomitant damages since the war was imposed on the Allied and Associated Governments "by the aggression of Germany and her Allies." Little or no historical investigation went into making this decision; it was simply a case of winners dictating terms to losers.
The major historical questions to answer are why it occurred and who was responsible for it—a daunting task yet an important one if we are to learn any lessons from the mistakes of the past. Historians have identified four major long-range causes of the war: nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the alliance system. But these causes only partly answer why in August 1914, after a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, Europe divided into two armed camps—the Allied Governments (England, France, and Russia, and later, Italy) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire)—and engaged in a conflict that would involve most European countries and spread to the rest of the world.
Important as these factors are, they fail to include the human factor in the equation. To what extent were the aims and policies of the major powers, which were formulated by individuals acting on behalf of national states, responsible for the war? Is there enough culpability to go around? Or was one nation and its policymakers responsible for the onset of the Great War? Of course, the Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the war, answered the question of responsibility. In the now-famous Article 231, Germany and her allies were held accountable for the war and all concomitant damages since the war was imposed on the Allied and Associated Governments "by the aggression of Germany and her Allies." Little or no historical investigation went into making this decision; it was simply a case of winners dictating terms to losers.
Guiding Question:
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Topics for Discussion:
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Reading:
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For this case study you are to analyze Chapter 27 The Coming of World War (Pgs. 822 - 830) and review the sources provided below. You are expected to be able to answer the guiding question in full depth with specific historical evidence and supporting details.
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Sources:
Source 4: Bernhard von Bulow, German Chancellor, speech to the Reichstag, Dec. 11, 1899
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In our nineteenth century, England has increased its colonial empire - the larges the world has seen since the days of the Romans... the French have put down rots in North Africa and East Africa,... Russia has begun its mighty course of victory in Asia,... We don't want to step on the toes of any foreign power, but at the same time we don't ever again want to become... the 'slaves of humanity.' But we'll only be able to keep ourselves at the fore if we realize that there is no welfare for us without power, without a strong army and a strong fleet. The means, gentlemen, for a people of almost 60 million - dwelling in the middle of Europe and, at the same time, stretching its economic antennae out to all sides - to battle its way through in the struggle for existence without strong armaments on land and at sea, have not yet been found. In the coming century the Germany people will be a hammer or an anvil.
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Source 5: The Schlieffen Plan
The Plan evolved when Alfred von Schlieffen was German Chief of Staff between 1891 and 1906. It was designed as an answer to Germany's dilemma should it find itself at war simultaneously with both France and Russia. The plan envisaged an initial effort in the west in an attempt to defeat France between the outbreak of war and the completion of Russian mobilization. The Original Plan Confronted by French fortifications along the common border, German troops would pass through Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium, the advance through northern France around the rear of the main French armies. Having won a great battle of encirclement, German forces would then be dispatched by rail to the east to fight the Russians. |
Source 6: V.R. Berghan, The Crisis of July 1914 and Conclusions
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In the afternoon of August 1, 1914, when the German ultimatum to Russia to revoke the Tsarist mobilization order of the previous day had expired, Wilhelm 11 telephoned [Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von] Moltke, [Reich Chancellor Theobald von] Bethmann Hollweg, [Admiral Alfred von] Tirpltz, and Prussian War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn to come without delay to the Imperial Palace to witness the Kaiser's signing of the German mobilization order that was to activate the Schlieffen Plan and the German invasion of Luxemburg, Belgium, and France. It was a decision that made a world war inevitable.
The meeting took place at 5 p.m. When the monarch had signed the fateful document, he shook Falkenhayn's hand and tears came to both men's eyes. However, the group had barely dispersed when it was unexpectedly recalled. According to the later report of the Prussian War Minister, "a strange telegram had just been received from Ambassador Lichnowsky" in London, announcing that he had been mandated by the British government "to ask whether we would pledge not to enter French territory if England guaranteed France's neutrality in our conflict with Russia." A bitter dispute apparently ensued between Bethmann Hollweg, who wanted to explore this offer, and Moltke, whose only concern by then was not to upset the meticulously prepared timetable for mobilization. The Chief of the General Staff lost the argument for the moment. The Kaiser ordered Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow to draft a reply to Lichnowsky, while Moltke telephoned the Army Command at Trier ordering the Sixteenth Division to stop its advance into Luxemburg. As Falkenhayn recorded the scene, Moltke was by now "a broken man" because to him the Kaiser's de-cision was yet another proof that the monarch "continued to hope for peace." Moltke was so distraught that Falkenhayn had to comfort him, while the latter did not believe for one moment "that the telegram [would] change anything about the horrendous drama that began at 5 p.m." Lichnowsky's reply arrived shortly before midnight, detailing the British condition that Belgium's border must remain untouched by the Germans. Knowing that German strategic planning made this impossible, Moltke now pressed Wilhelm II to order the occupation of Luxemburg as a first step to the German invasion of Belgium and France. This time he won; World War I had definitely begun. |
Source 8: Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Were German Militarism and Diplomacy Responsible?
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The Process of Escalation
By 10 August 1914 Europe was at war. What had started as the third Balkan war had rapidly become the First World War. How can one assess responsibility for these events? Who caused it? What could have been done differently to have prevented it? Such questions have troubled generations of historians since 1914 There are no clear answers. But the following observations may put the questions into context. The alliance/entente system created linking mechanisms that allowed the control of a state's strategic destiny to pass into a broader arena, one which the individual government could manage but not always totally control. Most specifically, this meant that any Russo-German quarrel would see France involved because of the very nature of Germany's offensive war plans. Until 1914 the alliance/entente partners had disagreed just enough among themselves to conceal the true impact of the alliance arrangements. The legacy of Germany's bombastic behavior, so characteristic of German Weltpolitik and Europalitik after 1898, also meant that Berlin was thoroughly mistrusted. Its behavior created a tone, indeed an edginess, that introduced fear into the international system, since only for Germany did mobilization equal war. Ironically, and not all historians agree, the German policy in 1914 may have been less provocative than earlier. But that summer Berlin paid the price for its earlier aggressiveness. Serbia allowed a terrorist act to proceed, then sought to evade the consequences of its action. It would gain, after 1918, the most from the war with this creation of the Yugoslav state. Paradoxically, however, the very ethnic rivalry: that brought Austria-Hungary to collapse would also plague the new state and its post-1945 successor. Austria-Hungary feared the threat posed by the emergence of the south Slavs as a political force. But the Dual Monarchy could not reform itself sufficiently to blunt the challenge. With the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand who had always favored peace, the monarchy lost the one person who could check the ambitions of General Conrad and mute the fears of the civilians While harsh, Ottokar Czernin's epitaph has a certain truth to it: 'We were condemned to die; we could only choose the manner of our death and we have chosen most terrible.' Germany believed that it must support its Danubian ally. This in turn influenced Berlin's position towards Russia and France. Without German backing, Vienna would probably have hesitated to been more conciliatory toward Belgrade. But, anxious to support Vienna and possibly to detach Russia from the Triple Entente, Berlin would risk a continental war to achieve its short- and long-term objectives. Berlin and Vienna bear more responsibility for starting the crisis and then making it very hard to control. Nevertheless, the Russians must also share some significant responsibility for the final outcome. St Petersburg's unwavering support of Serbia, its unwillingness to negotiate with Berlin and Vienna, and then its precipitate preparatory military measures escalated the crisis beyond control. Russia's general mobilization on 30 July guaranteed disaster. Those Russian decisions would in turn confront the French with the full ramifications of their alliance with Russia. Despite French expectations, the alliance with Russia had in fact become less salvation for Paris and more assuredly loom. France became the victim in the Russo-German fight. Throughout the crisis French leaders could only hope to convince Russia to be careful and simultaneously work to ensure that Britain came to their assistance. Paris failed in the first requirement and succeeded in the second. The decisions of August 1914 did not come easily for the British government. Grey could not rush the sharply divided cabinet. The decade-old entente ties to the French were vague and unwritten and had a history of deception and deviousness. Nor did the vicious political atmosphere created by Ireland help. Grey desperately hoped that the threat of British intervention would deter Ger-many; it did not. Could Grey have done more? Probably not, given the British political system and the precarious hold the Liberal Party had on power. Only a large standing British army would have deterred Germany, and that prospect, despite some recent assertions, simply did not exist. In July 1914 one or two key decisions taken differently might well have seen the war averted. As it was, the July crisis became a model of escalation and inadvertent consequences. The expectation of a short war, the ideology of offensive warfare, and continuing faith in war as an instrument of policy: all would soon prove illusory and wishful. The cold, hard, unyielding reality of modem warfare soon replaced the romantic, dashing legends of the popular press. The elite decision-makers (monarchs, civilian ministers, admirals, and generals) had started the war; the larger public would die in it and, ultimately, finish it. |
Source 9: Roland Doregeles: Paris – “That Fabulous Day”
In “After Fifty Years,” Roland Doregeles (1886 – 1973), a distinguished French writer, recalled the mood in Paris at the outbreak of the war. |
“It’s come!” It’s posted at the district mayor’s office, a passerby shouted to me as he ran. I reached the Rue Drount in one leap and shouldered through the mob that already filled the courtyard to approach the fascinating white sheet pasted to the door. I read the message at a glance, the reread it slowly, word for word, to convince myself that is was true:
The first day of Mobilization will be Sunday, August 2 Only three lines, written hastily by a hand that trembled. It was an announcement to a million and a half Frenchmen. The people who had read it moved away, stunned, while others crowded in, but this silent numbness did not last. Suddenly a heroic wind lifted their heads. What? War, was it? Well, then, let’s go! Without any signal, the “Marseillaise” poured from thousands of throats, sheafs of flags appeared at windows, and howling processions rolled out on the boulevards. Each column brandished a placard: Alsace Volunteers, Jewish Volunteers, Polish Volunteers. They hailed one another above the bravos of the crowd, and this human torrent, swelling at every corner, moved on to circle around the Place de la Concorde, before the statue of Strasbourg banked with flowers, then flowed toward the Place de la Republique, where mobs from Belleville and the Fauborg St. Antoine yelled themselves hoarse on the refrain from the great days “Aux armes, citoyens!” (to arms citizens!) But this time is was better than a song. To gather the news from my paper, I ran around the city in every direction. At the Cours la Reine I saw the fabled cuirassiers [cavalry] in their horsetail plumes march by, and at the rue La Fayette foot soldiers in battle garb with women throwing flowers and kisses to them. In a marshaling yard I saw guns being loaded, their long, this barrels twined around with branches and laurel leaves, while troops in red breeches piled gaily into delivery vans they were scrawling with challenges and caricatures. Young and old, civilians and military men burned with the same excitement. It was like a Brotherhood Day. Dead tired but still exhilarated, I got back to L’Homme Libre and burst into the office of Georges Clemenceau, our chief “What is Paris saying?” he asked me “It’s singing, sir!” “Then everything will be all right…” His old patriot’s heart was not wrong; no cloud marred that fabulous day… Less than twenty-four hours later, seeing their old dreams of peace crumble [socialist workers] would stream out into the boulevards… [but] they would break into the “Marseillaise,” not the “Internationale”; they would cry, “To Berlin!,” not “Down with war!” |